The Probability of the Possible by Ron Wilburn
Introduction
In his paper “Why is There Anything at 
All?” van Inwagen argues that it is as im-
probable as improbable can be that the 
actual world might have been uninhabited 
by concrete objects (van Inwagen, 1996). 
Even though this argument fails, it fails for 
an interesting reason: an unhealthy tension 
obtains between two of its premises, both 
essential to its soundness, concerning the 
nature of fully specified possible worlds. 
I summarize van Inwagen’s argument, de-
velop the aforementioned objection, and 
then detail a more general objection to the 
project of ascribing probability values to 
possible worlds.
Van Inwagen’s Argument:
Van Inwagen’s argument invokes four 
premises. (99)
(1) There are some beings
(2) If there is more than one possible 
world, there are infinitely many.
(3) There is at most one possible 
world in which there are no beings.
(4) For any two possible worlds, the 
probability of their being actual is 
equal (I
will sometimes call this the “equi-
probability assumption”).
(5) It is “as unlikely as unlikely could 
be” that the world could have had no 
concrete
occupiers.
THE PROBABILITY OF THE POSSIBLE
ABSTRACT
____________________________________________
In “Why is There Anything at All?” Peter van Inwa-
gen argues that even though it was never necessary that 
concrete beings existed, it was always maximally prob-
able – just short of necessity – that they did (van Inwa-
gen, 1996). I argue that van Inwagen’s argument fails, 
albeit for an interesting reason which has remained so 
far unnoticed in the literature: there is a critical ten-
sion between two of its premises, both essential to its 
soundness, concerning the nature of comprehensively 
specified possible worlds. I summarize van Inwagen’s 
argument, develop this objection, and then describe 
more problems which invariably accrue when we try to 
ascribe probability values to possible worlds.
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Herein, I treat premises (1) and (2) as unproblematic and deal with them only in passing.
My critical scrutiny is reserved for (3) and (4). This scrutiny proceeds in two stages. First,
I explicate these premises’ meanings and motivations. Second, I explore a joint weakness
that arises from an essential tension between them. Brief moralizing then follows.
First, let’s consider the two unproblematic premises. Premise (1), the assumption that there
are some beings, is certainly “a safe enough assumption,” based on empirical observation:
we know that the actual world is occupied because we can see that we and other items 
occupy it. (100) Premise (2), the claim that if more than one possible world exists, then 
infinitely many do, results from our ability to articulate an infinite number of alternative 
descriptions of reality, each corresponding to a distinct way that things might be. Van In-
wagon writes that it would be “bizarre” to suppose that properties which vary in magnitude 
or across an indefinite range of dimensions define only a limited number of worlds. He 
writes, “if there is more than one possible world, then things can vary; and it seems bizarre 
to suppose, given the kinds of properties had by the things we observe, properties that seem 
to imply a myriad of dimensions along which these things could vary continuously, that 
there might be just two or just 17 or just 510 worlds.” (56) The shape of my coffee cup, for 
instance, could presumably vary in an infinite number of ways, and each of these different 
ways would a difference-making feature of a distinct possible world.
As for the second two, much more problematic, premises, let’s first consider (3), i.e., the 
assumption that there is at most one possible world in which there are no beings. This 
premise emerges from van Inwagen’s contention that any two unoccupied worlds are iden-
tical, since all worlds share exactly the same abstract occupiers. Van Inwagen makes this 
assumption because he takes abstract objects (“numbers, pure sets, ‘purely qualitative’ 
properties and relations, possibilities, possible worlds themselves”) to be common to all 
possible worlds, and thus not effective difference-makers between them. Moreover, he 
takes the actual concerns expressed by “why anything exists” queries to regard concrete, 
rather than abstract, occupiers of reality. Philosophers worry, he tells us, that there might 
have been “no physical things, no stuffs, no events, no space, no time, no Cartesian egos, 
no God [and presumably no fields, forces and the like], etc.” It is this possibility, not one in 
which, say, the number 2 doesn’t exist, that fuels our anxieties about existential contingen-
cy.1  It is from this assumption that van Inwagen concludes that there can be but one empty 
possible world. For if there is only one way in which a world can be empty (by containing 
no concrete items), and being empty identifies a world as the world that it is, then no two 
empty worlds can be distinct.
Premise (4), the claim that the probability of any two worlds’ obtaining must be equal, 
1 Even though van Inwagen does not claim that this taxonomy of concrete occupiers is com-
prehensive, it appears to be so. Indeed, it seems redundant. To the extent that we view physical ob-
jects relativistically, as extended series of events, or worldbraids, and the properties of space/time as 
determined by relational configurations of such items, “objects, space, time and stuffs” fail to exist 
independently of events. The alleged existence of abstract objects in all possible worlds can perhaps 
best be understood by reference to their contrast with physical objects in this respect. Abstract objects 
exist outside of spacetime in the sense that they are existentially independent of the worldbraid mate-
rial occupiers of spacetime. Thus, their existence cannot vary across possible worlds as a function of 
differences in these worlds’ physical (event) occupiers.
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is the contention that van Inwagen spends the greatest time and effort defending. It is, he 
concedes, “the one that people are going to want to dispute” (101). Thus, van Inwagen’s 
defense of (4) is considerably more complicated than those of (1) – (3), requiring more 
in the way of both setup and explication. By way of setup, he asks us to imagine some 
system of objects and associated abstract states. which the s is either in or not.  These 
states, he suggests, behave logically very much like propositions, allowing us to treat pos-
sible worlds as state sets, the component states of which constitute the various details of 
the world in question. Van Inwagen asks us to think of possible worlds as sets of “fully 
consistent and maximal” possible states of affairs which, as a function of their maximality, 
remain “isolated” beyond the reach of “pre-cosmic selection machines.” Let’s pause briefly 
to explicate clarify these locutions.
To do this, let’s simplify things, paraphrasing to eliminate technical formulation whenever 
doing so doesn’t distort van Inwagen’s fundamental intent. A worlds is “maximal,” on 
his telling, if it consists of fully specified state sets, where said specification guarantees 
that any given possible state of affairs either obtains in that world or doesn’t. A world is 
“consistent” if it does not include states which stand in logical tension with each other; 
if it involves no states which both do and do not obtain. A world is isolated “if no facts 
about objects external to it could influence it.” Finally, a “pre-cosmic selection machine” 
(henceforth, “selector mechanism”) is a principle which operates from outside all possible 
worlds, and functions to determine the likelihood of any given world’s obtaining over its 
alternatives.   2 Talk of machines here is ambiguous. On one hand, these items might be 
construed as statistical laws, just as Turing machines are best construed as abstract pro-
grams. On the other hand, they might be construed as concrete machinery which functions 
to express or enforce such laws, just as (finite approximations of) Turing machines might 
be construed as desktop computers. For our purposes here, it seems best to understand se-
lector mechanism in the former terms, since translation into the latter terms is always avail-
able (e.g., talk of a law which dictates that the best of all possible worlds must be actual 
can always be paraphrased, if one chooses, into talk about Leibniz’ omnibenevolent God). 
With these locutions in hand, the rationale behind premise (4) becomes clear. Because pos-
sible worlds are maximal, i.e., completely inclusive with respect to all possible yfacts, each 
is an isolated system in the sense that there are no unspecified details about it yet to be de-
termined by other states that do not already partially constitute it.3 In particular, no selector 
2 Van Inwagen’s choice of locution (“pre-cosmic”) is, of course, particularly puzzling when 
we ask what the tense designation (if that’s what it’s supposed to be) is intended to tell us, given that 
possible worlds encompass entire world histories.
3 Note that in announcing my decision to treat premise (2) as unproblematic I am not com-
mitting myself to the claim that it is unproblematic. Jack Macintosh has pointed out a potential 
problem from which it suffers that we are only now in a position to articulate. As we have seen, van 
Inwagen argues for an infinitely large class of possible worlds by noting the multitude of descriptions 
that we can generate by imagining quantitative variations of various magnitudes across an indefinite 
range of dimensions (again, the shape of my coffee cup could seemingly vary in an infinite number 
of ways, and each of these different ways seemingly defines a distinct possible world.) Such a class 
is not merely infinite. It is non-denumerably infinite: it is uncountable because additional members, 
generated by the same imaginative procedure, always wait in the wings to be included within it. But 
mightn’t this fact suggest that possible worlds cannot be “maximal” in the way that van Inwagen 
takes them to be? For if an infinity of possible worlds is demonstrable through a procedure which 
shows them to be non-denumerably infinite, then mightn’t the specification of each such world re-
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mechanisms exercise such determining influence. This is because selector mechanisms, if 
there are such, exist (by stipulation) only externally to particular worlds, even though such 
externality is rendered impossible by the maximality which van Inwagen supposes these 
worlds to have. For any given state, the maximality of each possible world guarantees that 
this world either is or isn’t in that state. Because possible worlds are inclusive of all the 
ways the world might be, there is no neutral logical space between them from which selec-
tor mechanisms might operate. 
Van Inwagen makes one final inference before announcing his main conclusion. “For any 
system of objects with maximal states,” he writes, the maximal states of the system should 
be regarded as equally probable, provided that the system is isolated” (104). Van Inwagen’s 
intended reason for this is also clear: if there can be nothing external to maximal possible 
worlds which might privilege some of them over others, we should treat them all as having 
an equal probability of obtaining. “If a system is isolated,” van Inwagen tells us, “then any 
two of its maximal states are of equal probability. But then we have an argument for the 
conclusion that any two possible worlds are of equal probability: ‘Reality’ is an isolated 
system, and possible worlds are maximal states of Reality” (105-6).4 
As an aside, I doubt that this defense of the equiprobability assumption is cogent. On the 
face of it, it is difficult to see why different possible worlds are equally probable simply by
virtue of their mutual isolation. For, doesn’t such equiprobability also require the operation
of a selector mechanism able to dictate that isolation ensures equiprobability? Van Inwagen
assumes here that equiprobability is a natural default state for mutually isolated possible 
worlds. However it is hard to see why this should be the case. The default state could be 
one in which, say, our own actual world enjoys probabilistic advantage; to assume that it 
doesn’t requires us to assume that some selector mechanism be operative. 
However, let’s ignore this complication. For, as noted at the outset, my concern in this paper 
is not to argue against any of van Inwagen’s premises considered in isolation; it is rather to 
argue for the existence of a critical tension between them.
From his claim that isolation ensures equiprobabity, here van Inwagen proceeds to his 
quire us to specify, across a non-denumerable set of state description sentences, whether or not those 
sentences are true?
Is this a problem for van Inwagen? I am not quite sure. For the mere fact that a non-denumerable set 
of potential descriptions exist, each picking out a unique possible world, does not in itself imply that 
we can only specify the character of each such world by assigning truth-values across non-denumer-
able sets of state description sentences. On the face of it, we would seem to be able to conclude from 
the fact that the base of my cup might be round or square or oval or slightly differently oval, etc., that 
a non-denumerably infinite number of worlds exists without concluding anything at all concerning 
the number of assertions that we must make in order to specify the character of each of these particu-
lar worlds. Perhaps this issue is only decided when we take a position on the existence of negative 
properties (see footnote (6)). This would tell us whether or not we could specify the conditions defin-
ing a world as those in which, e.g., the base of my cup is round as opposed to those in which the base 
of my cup is round, and not square, and not oval, etc.
4 Premise (1), which maintains that some beings exist, functions in the background of this ar-
gument, but in a quiet way. Van Inwagen’s is concerned to make it clear from the outset that occupied 
worlds are possible. This is a reasonable precondition that must be satisfied for the other premises of 
the argument to do any effective work.
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major conclusion. Because possible worlds are infinite in number (premise 2) and all are 
equally probable (premise 4) and only one of them is devoid of beings (premise 3), the 
world in which there is nothing gets swamped by the worlds in which there is something. 
There is only one empty possible world to be actualized; however there are an infinite num-
ber of equally probable occupied alternatives. Thus, while it is not impossible that nothing 
exists, it is as improbable as improbable can be.5
Problems
Van Inwagen’s argument has been the object of criticism before, generally by way of ob-
jection to either of premises (3) or (4).  Again, however, my strategy here is somewhat 
different. It exploits a crucial tension that arises between (3) and (4). These two premises, 
I maintain, are in conflict because they are motivated by contradictory intuitions regarding 
the nature of “maximal” possible worlds.
Remember again the rationale behind (4), i.e., the claim that all possible worlds are equi-
probable. Because each possible world is maximal, there are no unspecified details about it 
that might be determined by other states that do not already help constitute it. This is what 
makes it isolated, i.e., beyond the influence of any conceivable selector mechanisms able 
to render some worlds more or less (or equally) probable than others. In contrast with this, 
however, the rationale behind (3), i.e., the claim that there is at most one empty possible 
world, is that all that matters to making a world the world that it is are its concrete occupi-
ers. Thus, it is only through the differential existence of such concrete items that differ-
ences can accrue between worlds. But possible worlds, so conceived (by (3)), are surely not 
maximal in the sense required by (4). This is because premise (4)’s conception of maximal-
ity is one on which the distinguishing role, not merely of concreta, but of laws, including 
those very general laws defining selector mechanisms,” must be taken into account.
To see why this is the case, let’s think more closely about selector mechanisms. If they 
existed, what would they be like? We have construed them as very general statistical laws 
rendering some worlds more or less (or equally) probable than others. What might ex-
amples of such laws look like? One candidate van Inwagen considers is a variation of 
Leibniz’ simplicity imperative: simpler worlds are more likely than complicated ones. 
Now, of interest to us here is the fact that in neither Leibniz’ nor van Inwagen’s hands is 
the criteria of such simplicity merely ontological; it is nomological also. In Leibniz’ case, 
5 Manson, Neil A., 2011, “No Chance for Nothing,” American Philosophical Association 
Pacific Division Conference, San Diego, CA. Manson poses a significant challenge to van Inwagen’s 
argument by objecting to premise (4) on the grounds that it violates countable additivity, the principle 
dictating that the collective probabilities of each individual world’s obtaining must equal the overall 
probability of some or another of these worlds obtaining. This is a compelling criticism, but not one 
that I will pursue here. The problem he highlights is simply this. Since these worlds exhaust all the 
ways that reality could be, the overall probability that one or another of them obtains must be 1. But 
this poses a dilemma once we note that the sum that we get when we add together the probability 
values of each individual world’s obtaining is either less or more than 1. We cannot ascribe probabili-
ties in such circumstances without giving up the idea that various possibilities sum together to make 
up 100 percent of the original probability space. Thus, we cannot ascribe probabilities across infinite 
ranges of possible worlds.
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it is arguable that the pertinent criterion of “simplicity” is primarily nomological: there is 
little significant respect in which the self-probabilifying simplicity of a world consists in 
its containing fewer constitutive items or fewer types of items than its modal  alternatives. 
Rather, Leibniz’ best of all possible worlds is that which is “richest in phenomena,” but 
“simplest in hypotheses,” where these hypotheses are best understood as articulating the 
law-like regularities governing phenomena (Leibniz, 1992, sec. VI).
In van Inwagen’s hands, the simplicity imperative assumes a different form. One world is 
simpler than another, he suggests, if it is fully specifiable by a more minimal description, 
if we need say less about it in the course of fully specifying its nature (106).6  But here we 
also have a criterion of simplicity before us which is primarily nomological in character, 
since it must surely register the number of assumptions generally which a theory makes 
about the world, not merely the number of assumptions it makes concerning the number 
(or kinds) of entities which that theory posits. One theory of the world is not made simpler 
than another merely by virtue of positing fewer items, it is also made simpler by being 
regulated by fewer laws governing these items’ interaction. Theoretical scope is of value 
largely for its capacity to simplify various domains of phenomena by unifying them under 
single, shared explanatory rubrics.
 
Now, it seems a safe bet that what applies to simplicity in this regard applies to candidate 
“selector mechanisms” generally. Simplicity stands in close relation to various other vir-
6 It is worth noting that there may be problems with the very idea that the simplicity of pos-
sible worlds can be read off their alleged capturability by or concise descriptions. Van Inwagen’s 
suggestion, once again, is that the simpler worlds are those about which we need say the least in the 
course of specifying their natures. But what must we presuppose for such a criterion to work? One 
thing we must presuppose is that we can objectively distinguish between featureless and cluttered 
regions of the universe. We must presuppose that in specifying the character of a worldly region, we 
can identify the default state which must obtain in order for that region to count as uncluttered. But 
why should we assume this? The intuition that motivates the assumption is certainly clear: worlds 
without concreta are simpler than worlds with concreta by virtue of being less cluttered. But, once 
again, suppose we approach things relativistically and view physical objects as ordered event sets or 
worldbraids, the relational configurations between which determine the properties of spacetime it-
self. On such an account, all of the concreta that van Inwagen posits, “objects, space, time and stuffs” 
are real, but dependent upon events. Such an account might even offer advantages to van Inwagen’s 
account for its ability to clearly contrast abstracta with concreta, at least in the actual world: abstract 
objects are those items which exist outside of spacetime in the sense that they are existentially inde-
pendent of the worldbraid material occupiers of spacetime.
If we construe our ontology in these terms, however, it becomes less clear that the worlds van In-
wagen describes as ontologically Spartan admit of simpler description than the worlds he regards 
as (relatively) more cluttered. For a natural way to characterize fundamental reality on the model 
envisioned above is to attribute property exemplifications to either individual space/time points or to 
regions of space/time. To specify reality, on such a telling, is to describe for each space-time point 
or region the properties occurrent within it, so that concreta are construable as regions of space-time 
in which objects’ essential and contingent properties are exemplified. But then the question arises as 
to whether or not negative properties exist. If they do, then our description of a space-time region in 
which a basketball exists (e.g., a region in which properties P, Q and R are exemplified) can be no less 
simple than our description of a region in which one does not exist (i.e., a region in which ~P, ~Q and 
~R are exemplified). The issue of whether or not negative properties exist has much to do with the 
question of whether or not they have causal powers, which itself has much to do with the analysis of 
causation one decides to accept (on counterfactual theories, for instance, it is arguable that negative 
properties do have causal powers). But this is an issue beyond the scope of the present paper. Nick 
Zangwill offers a nice primer on these issues (Zangwill, 2011).
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tues which we typically prize in theories. Comprehensiveness (construed as a measure of 
the number of phenomena explained and predicted) and scope (construed as a measure of 
the number of types of phenomena explained and predicted) both appeal, in part, to deeper 
simplicity considerations: the idea in the case of each is to unify diverse happenings under 
as few encompassing explanatory rubrics as possible. Thus, it is no accident that simplicity 
has generally been the historical poster boy for selector mechanisms, whether the question 
at issue has been that of determining which possible worlds are most likely, or that of de-
termining which of competing empirically equivalent theories or models of nature are true 
or provide the “best” available overall explanation of things.7
To return to the issue of the tension between van Inwagen’s premises (3) and (4), the 
significance of the above observations is that a world’s simplicity (and thus any other 
candidate probabilifying feature) is most plausibly construed as a function of both its onto-
logical and nomological attributes. Thus, to individuate worlds in terms of such probabili-
fying features, we must invoke criteria for distinguishing between worlds that mention, not 
merely the concreta constituting these worlds, but also the laws that govern these concreta. 
Moreover, premise (4) presupposes that the pertinent individuating laws in operation here 
include also those very general laws which constitute the pertinent selector mechanisms 
(so that the features individuating a world as the world it is must include, e.g., not only that 
world’s simplicity, but also the selector mechanism which dictates that simpler worlds are 
more likely to exist than complicated ones). This is required by the maximality feature that 
van Inwagen finds it necessary to attribute to possible worlds in order to isolate them from 
the influence of any external selector mechanisms which might disturb their equiprobabil-
ity with respect to each other. 
We now have our essential tension between premise (4), which requires that we individuate 
worlds in terms of concreta and laws – including those laws which are the selector mecha-
nisms, as required by the maximality condition – with premise (3), which requires that 
worlds are individuated only by their constitutive concreta, since empty worlds are identi-
cal only if this is the case. Without the former individuation criteria, we cannot guarantee 
the equiprobability of possible worlds. Without the latter individuation criteria, we cannot 
infer that there is but one empty possible world. We must instead conclude that there are 
infinitely many empty possible worlds, each distinguished from the others by its regulative 
laws.
Now, to say this we must make sense of the idea that worlds could remain distinct by virtue 
of being regulated by distinct natural laws rather than by being inhabited by distinct con-
crete denizens. To this end, we must presuppose certain features regarding natural laws. In 
particular, we must eschew Humean (or “systems” or “regularity”) accounts on which laws 
of nature merely articulate uniformities in nature (e.g., actions are followed by equal and 
opposite reactions, the speed of light is c), and thus supervene on items in the world (Mill 
1947; Lewis 1983, 1994). Instead, we must adopt some or other necessitarian account on 
which natural laws actually govern these constancies, effectively making them transpire. 
7 A notable example of this is to be found in Vogel (1990, 658-666). Here Vogel uses a cri-
terion of explanatory comprehensiveness to argue that common skeptical hypotheses must always be 
worse explanations of experience than our everyday theory of prosaic physical reality.
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Note, however, that having committed to a necessitarian view of this sort, we need not 
commit to any particular necessaritarian view. We may need to suppose that natural laws 
are describable as counterfactual relations between natural items, but we need not identify 
these relations as obtaining between objects and their properties, or between events, or 
between property exemplifications.8
Fortunately, I think that a necessitarian construal of natural laws is justified. John Carroll 
assembles a number of thought experiments which speak decisively in favor of such non- 
Humean accounts of law. (Carroll 2011) For instance, it seems perfectly reasonable to sup-
pose that laws govern the ways in which particles would interact even in worlds in which 
they don’t interact due to merely contingent circumstances which keep said interactions 
from ever occurring (Tooley 1977, 669). Similarly, consider a universe in which a single 
concrete object moves through otherwise empty space at a constant velocity of one meter/
second. Carroll observes that there would seem to be a fact of the matter as to whether or 
not object velocity in this world is a constant or a non-constant feature of bodies. We can 
intelligibly pose the question  of whether or not this velocity would change, for example, 
if the object were to collide with other inertial items (at least on an absolute conception of 
space)? The point is that no unique set of laws supervenes on the original imagined world, 
despite the fact that there still seems to be a fact of the matter as to what would happen if its 
circumstances were to vary. Humeanism looks to be false because the laws of a world are 
not uniquely determined by that world’s total physical state. In particular, it is not uniquely 
determined by its number and kinds of concrete occupiers.
There may be other seeming complications for the account of possible world individuation 
described above, on which nomology floats free of ontology. But I suspect that in these 
cases also the problems at issue turn out to be either merely apparent or else easily ad-
dressed. For instance, we might worry that things get messy when we adopt a necessitarian 
view that calls for counterfactual analyses of laws, given that such counterfactual analysis 
invariably invokes modal alternatives which are likely to cross-entangle possible worlds 
from the outset in unwelcome and unforeseen ways. But this worry strikes to me illusory. 
For one thing, it gives us no reason to suspect that such entanglement, even if it did occur, 
would force us to describe possible worlds in terms of van Inwagen-style selector mecha-
nisms. For another thing, it is at least arguable that any counterfactual assertions we might 
use to specify natural laws are reducible to claims referring only to the categorical bases 
which render these counterfactual assertions true, leading us to talk about causal propensi-
ties of substances and events. This point holds, I suspect, for most if not all modal claims. 
For instance, if it is an a posteriori necessary truth that water is H20, then the modal fact 
that worlds containing H20 must contain water is best fleshed out by reference to intrinsic 
and categorical features of water. 
In short, I think it a safe assumption that the conflict between the individuation criteria for 
8 We might be obliged to eschew accounts, however, on which natural laws relate abstract 
universals like properties (Armstrong 1978, 1983; Dretske 1977, Tooley 1977, 1987). Once again, 
this is because both properties and relations, on van Ingwagen’s account, exist (qua abstracta) across 
all possible worlds, including whatever relation of non-logical necessitation might serve to associate 
any two properties related in a law-like fashion.
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possible worlds required by (3) and (4), respectively, keep van Inwagen’s final conclusion 
from going through. He cannot depict a single empty possible world as being swamped by 
an infinite number of inhabited alternatives and claim in consequence that it is as unlikely 
as unlikely can be that there could have been nothing at all. This would be an arbitrary 
inference, no less than would be an inference to the conclusion that the probability that the 
world is empty is 1/2 and the probability that it is not empty is 1/2. 
 
Conclusions and Morals
I have argued both that premises (3) and (4) are in conflict. I take this point to be impor-
tant to the end of critiquing van Inwagen’s argument. I have also argued against premise 
(3): on certain appealing accounts of natural law, van Inwagen can be seen as simply 
miscounting the number of empty worlds. Beyond these points, however, it is important 
to note that premise (4) is also questionable, and not merely because van Inwagen settles 
on the particular distribution of probabilities over possible worlds that he does. Rather, 
the problem is that invoking objective probability in our dealings with possible worlds is 
always a mistake. This is because such invocation can be nothing more than a veiled invo-
cation of subjective (or epistemic or conditional) probability instead. The conclusion van 
Inwagen aims to derive concerns the way that the cosmos (as we may call the collection 
of all possible worlds) is. But this can hardly be done using the notion of conditional prob-
ability that he is working with. For irrespective of whether he construes possible worlds 
as collections of concreta (as suggested by premise (3)) or as collections of concreta and 
governing laws (as suggested by premise (4)), he can never be in a position to avow the 
equiprobability of possible worlds as anything more than a methodological principle of in-
ference. What his reflections tell him is only that he has no a priori reason to privilege the 
probability of one possible world over that of another. Thus, the judgment that all worlds 
are equiprobable can reflect little more than a decision on his part. It can reflect nothing 
more than a procedurally dictated ascription of initial probabilities. This ascription may 
correctly reflect facts about human ignorance. But it does not reflect (for all we know) the 
way of the cosmos. This is seemingly the case for any interpretation of probability which 
is both plausible and potentially applicable to possible worlds.9 10 11 12 
9 Classical interpretations are of no help here, as they would presumably presuppose that the 
probability of any given possible world’s obtaining to be 1/infinity, precisely the kind of procedural 
assignment of values which, I have suggested, we have no reason to suppose gets at the metaphysi-
cal truth of the matter. Frequency interpretations look to be, at best, marginally applicable in this 
context, since the obtaining of a possible world isn’t part of a sequence of events within which the 
relative frequency of that world’s obtaining can be estimated (not that such a relative frequency 
could be determined in any case). Finally, Carnapian logical interpretations, on which syntactic fea-
tures of premises generate degrees of confirmation for conclusions are, I take it, no longer regarded 
as plausible (Carnap 1950). Given the problem I have highlighted, i.e., the fact that the maximality 
of van Inwagen’s possible worlds would seem to require that they include relevant selector mecha-
nism, the interpretation of probability which would seem to be best fitted to entire possible worlds 
is some or other variant of Popper’s, on which the probability of a world would be regarded as an 
objective feature of that world, i.e., intrinsic features of it which probabilify its obtaining (Popper 
1959). But again, such accounts are not without their problems, and it is hard to see how we could 
know that such features obtain.
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else common to a class of, metaphysically possible worlds that distinguish them from merely logi-
cally possible ones. Because we never have access to a broad enough background of statistical law to 
which we might appeal, it is impossible to make judgments concerning the objective or metaphysical 
probabilities of entire worlds in order to revise the equiprobability assumption we may have origi-
nally made in order to get a leg up on Bayesian reasoning. Objective judgments of probability must 
always be, to quote Derik Parfit, “grounded on facts about the world, so that such judgments cannot 
be applied either to how the whole of reality might be, or to how reality might be explained.”
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11 The sort of story I’ve told above (in footnote 10) is also illuminating in certain epistemo-
logical contexts. In particular, it helps to explain the Cartesian skeptic’s conception of knowledge as 
epistemic certainty. This conception should not be viewed as the result of some unmotivated and irra-
tional decision to impose arbitrarily high standards upon our ordinary epistemic practice. Rather, it is 
better viewed as a result of the skeptic’s attempts to talk about justification even when the generality 
of his inquiry robs the notion of degrees of justification of any possible purchase. Comprehensive 
skeptical scenarios are like maximal possible worlds. They jointly exhaust the whole of logical space, 
leaving no presuppositional material through the use of which one might judge common sense real-
ism to be more likely than its various skeptical alternative scenarios. Thus, for the skeptic knowledge 
would have to be certainty to be anything at all. The range of epistemic states intermediate between 
absolute certainty and abject ignorance collapses like a broken accordion.
12 Baysean issues aside, the problems we encounter whenever we endeavour to determine 
the relative probabilities of alternatives ways the world might have been are nicely illustrated by a 
recent and celebrated examples. Without pretending to understand the cutting-edge physics (Thank 
God), and looking instead merely at certain formal features of the proposal, we can see in Stephen 
Hawking’s recent popular packaging of his “Grand Design” argument an attempt to identify intrinsic 
self-probabilifying characteristics of the actual world (Hawking and Mlodinow 2010). For his is an 
account on which the internal features of M-theory (which he alternately treats as a truly unified 
field theory and as a mere collocation of disparate accounts which collectively explain the whole of 
nature) breathe life into its own equations in a way that brings our universe into existence. Hawking’s 
fundamental assumption is that the total (positive and negative) energy of the universe must remain 
constant. Thus, “on the scale of the entire universe the positive energy of matter can be balanced by 
negative gravitational energy,” so that transformations from the latter to the former can create mass 
from the background energy vacuum alone. The fact of gravity is the thing that brings about such 
transformation, on Hawking’s account. “Because there is a law such as gravity, the Universe can and 
will create itself from nothing.” (Kindel edition, no pagination) Moreover, the universe so brought 
about must be replete with the fundamental laws and physical constants that characterize our own 
world. This allegedly follows from the requirement of supersymmetry, the counteractive balance 
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between force-making and matter-making particles, and the accompanying fact that M-theory is “the 
most general supersymmetric theory of gravity” and thus “the only candidate for a complete theory 
of the universe.”
For our purposes, what is intriguing about Hawking’s description is, again, not the details, but his 
summary claim that the genuine miracle in all of this “is that abstract considerations of logic lead to a 
unique theory that predicts and describes a vast universe full of the amazing variety we see” (Kindel 
edition, no pagination). For surely the assumption of supersymmetry is not a matter of abstract logic. 
Nor can M-theory be unproblematically identified as uniquely consistent in any interesting way. John 
Horgan has noted that M-theory is but one iteration of string theory, which has enjoyed two decades 
of popularity less for the its actual merits than for lack of decent alternatives (and possibly because 
of the near-religious enthusiasm of its adherents). Whatever the merits of the approach, no one is in 
a position to proclaim its logically inevitability. More interestingly, it has also been noted that M-
theory comes in an almost infinite number of versions, each of which predicts a different universe. 
(Horgan 2010) This result is embraced by Hawking, who proclaims that all of these universes ex-
ist. But to say this is to seriously muddy the original proposition we set out to defend, i.e., that an 
examination of the intrinsic features of some particular world (say, the actual one) might provide us 
grounds for proclaiming its probabilistic privilege relative to its alternatives. What force can there be 
to the claim that intrinsic features of the actual world privilege its existence if a nearly infinite number 
of alternative possible worlds also “exist”?
Unrelatedly, the significance of Hawking’s assertions is additionally muddled by his avowal of “mod-
el-dependent realism.” When he asserts, for instance, “there is no model-independent test of reality 
[and] it follows that a well-constructed model creates a reality of its own,” it becomes less than clear 
even what makes a “final theory of nature” worthy of the designation. It also reminds us that a role yet 
remains for philosophy to urge clarity on the part of scientists. I would be so bold as to suggest that 
Hawking’s own lack of precision in such matters belies his assertion that “philosophy (i.e., metaphys-
ics, philosophy of science) is dead.”
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